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Equalization of Municipal Services:
The Economics of Serrano and Shaw
In recent years, a number of courts have used the Equal Protection
Clause to mandate substantial changes in the distribution of local pub-
lic goods and services. Their decisions form two distinct groups. In the
first, including Hobson v. Hansen,' Hadnot v. City of Prattville," and
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,3 the courts ordered equalization of munic-
ipal services between racially distinct neighborhoods where existing
distribution patterns were characterized by considerable disparities.
4
In the second, including Serrano v. PriestP and its progeny,0 the courts
invalidated state systems of educational finance which made the qual-
ity of a child's education dependent on the wealth of his family and
his community. 7 These cases have been paralleled by a vast and rapidly
expanding collection of legal commentary advocating judicial action
to introduce greater equality in the distribution of public goods and
services.8 Yet, while both the cases and commentary have explored the
1. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). affd sub noin. Smuck v. Hob-
son, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
2. Hadnot v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (D. Ala. 1970).
3. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), afrd en bant, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1972).
4. While it did not deal with traditional municipal serices, Norwalk CORE v. Nor-
walk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), invohed a similar problem of
equalization within the local public sector: Low income blacks and low income whites
were not being relocated with equal effectiveness following urban renewal.
5. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
6. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870
(D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ariz.. Jan. 13, 1972);
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). Similar suits are at various
stages of the judicial process in at least twenty-six additional states. AN ALYStS OF INML*.-
STATE SCHOOL FINANCE CASES; U.S. Office of Education Task Force on School Finance (1972).
7. Prior to Serrano, at least two federal courts had refused to order statewide equal -
ization of educational opportunities on the basis of student needs. Burniss v. Wilkerson,
310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969). afrd mere., 397 U.S. 44 (1970); Mclnnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), alf'd per curiarm sub nowa. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969). These earlier cases were distinguished in Serrano et at. on grounds that
questions of student need were substantially different front questions of school finance.
5 Cal. 3d at 615-17, 487 P.2d at 1263-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-25. The only case following
McInnis is Spano v. Board of Education of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. #1, 68 Mic 2d
804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. CL 1972).
8. The number of articles in the field is legion. See note 11 infra for a summary of
views presented in the commentary and references to illustrative sources.
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relevant doctrinal issues at length, 9 they have devoted surprisingly little
attention to the economic consequences of, or grounds for, judicial
intervention. 0
This Note will analyze the probable impact of judicial intervention
in terms of a plausible and relatively familiar economic model for the
efficient provision of local public goods and services. Part I describes
the model within the framework of traditional economic analysis;
Part II then explores the consequences that result when various assump-
tions underlying the model are relaxed. In both sections, the implica-
tions of a judicially-imposed standard of per capita equality are ex-
amined. This particular standard was chosen because it is frequently,
although not uniformly, suggested by both the courts1 and commen-
9. See, e.g., J. CooNs, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION (1970); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis
of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 720 (1972), Michehnan, Forward:
On Protecting the Poor Through The Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAZy. L. REv. 7 (1969);
Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of Municipal
Services, 4 HARV. Civ. RmsS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1968); Comment, The Evolution of Equal
Protection: Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARV. Civ. RiTrrs-Civ. Ln.
L. REV. 103 (1972).
10. There are several notable exceptions. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 9, ex-
plore in some detail the fiscal effects of financing public education through property
taxes levied and spent by autonomous local political units. Schoettle, The Equal Pro-
tection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1355 (1971), analyzes the in.
plications of local governmental budgetary decision-making processes for judicial inter-
vention in the financing of public education. Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School
Financing Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972),
examines the potential impact of a centralized educational financing system on the
tax burdens of those in various income groups and communities within Connecticut.
11. The courts in Hobson, Norwalk CORE, Hadnot, and Shaw explicitly imposed
standards of per capita equality between racially segregated sections of single political
units. In Hadnot the court "permanently enjoined and restrained [the defendants] from
failing to substantially equalize, within one year from the date of (the] order, the
equipment, facilities, and services provided in North Highland Park [situated in the
black section of town] with those heretofore provided in and for Pratt Park (situated
in the white section of town]." 309 F. Supp. at 975 (emphasis added). In Shau, the de-
fendants were ordered to prepare a plan, subject to court approval, for "tie equaliza-
tion of municipal services" between black and white areas of the town. 437 F.2d at
1293. In Hobson the court required equalized distribution of teachers among all schools
in the District of Columbia, as measured by salary expenditures. While not specifically
requiring equalization of per pupil expenditures for black and white students, tle court
implicitly adopted that standard as the appropriate criterion against which to test the
distribution of educational services. Finally, the decision in Norwalk CORE, although
not involving a final decree, suggested that the only appropriate remedy would be
equally effective relocation for both whites and non-whites. 395 F.2d at 929-30.
These decisions may be viewed as traditional Fourteenth Amendment cases involving
racial discrimination. But they can also be interpreted as setting an implicit standar
of per capita equality within political units in the face of disparities by race or in.
come. See, in particular, the first majority opinion in Shaw, 437 F.2d at 1287 n.1, and
the subsequent concurring opinion by Judge Wisdom in the en banc decision, 461 F.2d
at 1175. For a contrary view, see Judge Roney's dissent in the en banc decision, 461 F.2d
at 1182-83. Both interpretations involve certain difficulties, as discussed at pp. 105.06,
113-15 infra.
The school finance cases have thus far expressly declined to specify a particular mode
of educational funding. There is language in Serrano which strongly implies that edu.
cational expenditures must be equivalent for all students. See 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487
P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 615-19. Yet there is also a strong suggestion in the
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tators,'2 and because it is an effective means of highlighting the eco-
nomic model itself. The central thesis of that model is that allocative
efficiency results from the differential availability of municipal services
opinion that the court would go no further than to require a system of "fisca
capacity equalizing" or "fiscal neutrality," whereby a given tax rate would penit the
same level of expenditure per pupil in any community. See id. at 597-604. 487 P2d at
1250-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15. Post-Serrano decisions have been almost as vague in dc-
fining appropriate remedies. The Rodriguez court emphasized that it was requiring
only "fiscal neutrality" and was not establishing a standard of per capita equality in
educational expenditures. Nevertheless, while leaving the legislature with rsponsibilit)
for formulating a specific financing system, the court did indicate that state-wide uni-
formity would be one acceptable approach. See 337 F. Supp. at 283.84. In contrast. there
is language in Robinson implying that both a state guarantee of some adequate minihumn
educational output and the equalization of fiscal capacities would be required. See 287
A.2d at 217.
12. Prior to Shaw several commentators urged judicial imposition of a standard of
per capita equality in the provision of municipal services. See, e.g., Abascal, Municipal
Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HAsr.
L.J. 1367 (1969); Ratner, supra note 9, at 40; Note, The Right to Adequate Municipal
Services: Thoughts and Proposals, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 753 (1969). See also F. Michelman.
Obtaining a Fair Share of Municipal Services Through Legal Proceedings (undated
memo prepared for the Civil Rights Law Institutes of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund).
Since Shaw, the standard of per capita equality within political units has been ac-
cepted without question by the commentators. See, e.g., Comment, Equal Protection: The
Right to Equal Municipal Services, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 568 (1971); Note, Constitutional
Law-Equal Protection-Affirmative Relief Requiring Equalization of 3f unicipal Services-
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 49 J. Upu. L. 425, 436-37 (1971); Note, Equal Protection in
the Urban Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46 TUL. L. REV. 496
(1972). See also Ellington and Jones, The Court as City Manager, 5 GA. L. REv. 734
(1971); Comment, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw-Equal Protection and Municipal Services:
A Small Leap for Minorities but a Giant Leap for the Commentators, 1971 UrAt L.
REv. 397.
Among numerous pre-Serrano works advocating state-wide equalization of public
school expenditures and/or educational opportunity: A. WISE, Rmnc Sctoos. Pooa
ScHooLs: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPoRrUxrNT (1968); Horowitz & Neitring,
Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Pro-
grams from Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A L. REv. 787 (1968); Rousellot,
Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes in the Public Schools of the North
and West: The Emerging Role for Private Constitutional Litigation, 35 GEO. WAsH. L. Rz'.
698 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Law: Financing Public Education Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 590 (1971); Commcnt, Intrastate Inequalities in
Educational Opportunity, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 7 (1970). But see Coons, Chine, and Sugar-
man, supra note 9 (rejecting direct equalization and arguing instead for a s)stem of
fiscal capacity equalizing); Michelman, supra note 9 (arguing for a "minimum pro-
tection" standard).
One of the few post-Serrano pieces to focus on the question of standards is Note.
Equal Educational Opportunity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST. JotH's L. REV. 280
(1971). It rejects both fiscal equalization and minimum standard guarantees in favor of
per capita equality. The Symposium, Who Pays for Tomorrow's Schools: The Emerging
Issues of School Finance Equalization, 2 YALE REV. L. AND Soc. Acron 1 (1972), con-
tains, inter alia, critiques of Serrano by Wise and by Coons, Clune & Sugannan. The
former urges that Serrano be interpreted as mandating per capita equality, id. at 127-30;
the latter, that Serrano be interpreted as mandating fiscal capacity equaization, id. at
117-19. See also the pre-Serrano works by these commentators, supra notes 9 & 12. Cf.
Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest and the Financing of Public Education in
Kansas: Beyond the Rhetoric, 20 KAN. L. REv. 433 (1972); Note, A Statistical Analysis
of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars. 81 YALz L.J.
1303 (1972).
Finally, it has been suggested that Shaw and Serrano may be read together to re-
quire state-wide equalization of all municipal services. See, e.g., Comment, The Evolu-
tion of Equal Protection, supra note 9, at 199.
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coupled with individual choices of residential location; a standard of
per capita equality would clearly destroy this efficiency generating
process.
Part III explores redistribution as a justification for altering the
consequences described by the economic model. This issue is first dis-
cussed in terms of a theory of fundamental interests whereby all indi-
viduals are deemed to have a basic right to specific goods or services.
It is suggested that such a right, as well as the distribution pattern that
appropriately accompanies it, must hinge on the nature of the specific
good or service in question, rather than on the process by which the
good or service is distributed. In this regard, a standard of per capita
equality may well have substantial conceptual and practical flaws, and
it further appears that any standard that confines its focus to particular
distribution processes may be equally unsound.
Part III also discusses the redistribution issue in connection with the
methods by which municipal services are financed. Residence in a
wealthy community provides substantial advantages which are denied
low income persons by exclusionary zoning. This, in turn, is simply
one aspect of a range of distributional questions relating to locational
opportunities. In this context, equalization of fiscal capacities and the
elimination of exclusionary zoning are explored as potential judicial
standards. Here it appears that, while both have uncertain conse-
quences from an efficiency standpoint, the elimination of exclusionary
zoning is the most appropriate means of influencing the distribution
of income, while equalization of fiscal capacities represents, at best,
an uneasy compromise.
I. The Theoretical Models
Neoclassical economics, which provides the conceptual framework
for the following discussion, is concerned with the efficient allocation
of resources and of goods and services. Efficiency in consumption is
viewed in terms of the traditional Pareto optimal condition that no
individual can be made better off without making some other person
worse off. Conversely, if a system fails to exploit situations where the
welfare of some individuals could be increased without reducing the
welfare of others, then it is an inefficient system of allocation.
13. The allocation of resources for the production of goods and services and the
allocation of goods and services among consumers are a single process. The discussion
here, however, focuses only on the latter part of the process.
The distinction between allocation and distribution must be kept clear. The former
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The process whereby efficiency is achieved depends on various char-
acteristics of the good or service involved. Economics has traditionally
dealt with two polar categories: pure private and pure public goods.
Only recently has attention shifted to the hybrid category of "local"
public goods and services.
A. The Allocation of "Pure" Goods and Services'-
The basic teaching of traditional economic theory is that under cer-
tain conditions15 efficiency will result from market (private sector) allo-
cation. One of these conditions is that the goods and services be purely
private-that their benefits accrue solely to the individual consumer,
and that it is feasible to exclude others from enjoying them. The
model also assumes a given pattern of income distribution.' 0 The most
remarkable aspect of the private sector is, of course, that it functions
properly when each individual acts independently to maximize his own
welfare. That is, the marketplace "automatically" operates efficiently;
it is unnecessary to introduce collective regulation or decision-making.
There are, however, certain types of goods and services which the
marketplace cannot allocate efficiently. 7 This is particularly true of
pure public goods and services-where the utility18 derived by one
individual does not reduce the benefits available to all other individ-
refers to the goods and services obtained by individuals given their incomes and
wealth; the latter refers to transfers between individuals which arc not in exchange
for goods or services. These transfers may be in the form of either cash (income) or
goods and services (in-kind).
14. Among numerous works on private sector allocation, see, e.g., W. BAu.IoL,
EcoNoMIc THEORY AND OPERATIONs ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1963): R. DOPFSIA . TIE PRIcE
SYsrE.M (1964); C. FracusoN, MiCROECONO.tMC THEORY (rev. ed. 1969). J. HE.DErsON &
R. QUANDT, MIcROECONomC THEORY: A MATHE ATICAL APPROACH Cd cd. 1971).
Discussion of public finance theory throughout this Note relics in large measure on
J. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUnLC GooDs (1968); W. Hnscsl, THE
ECONOMICS oF STATE AND LOCAL GovE.tFN r (1970); L. loIL4NSE.,, PuLC EcoNo.lics
(1965); R. MUSCRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (195); C. SHOUP, Punuc FINANCE
(1969).
15. These conditions include the following: the goods and services produced and dis-
tributed are purely private, competition is pure, all participants possess perfect knowl-
edge, individuals act in their own self-interest, the economy is at full-employment, and
the society has realized its desired pattern of income distribution.
16. If the society chooses to alter the distribution pattern, then the optimal alloca-
tion pattern will also change. See pp. 108-11 infra.
It should be noted that distribution is concerned with wealth as well as with in-
come. These two terms are used interchangeably throughout.
17. In general, there are three bases for government intervention in the production and
provision of goods and services: allocation, redistribution, and stabilization. The first
involves public goods and services, as discussed below. It also involves regulation in
situations of "natural monopoly" and efforts to maintain purely competitive conditions
in the private sector. Stabilization involves efforts by the government to influence rates of
growth, employment, and inflation. The redistributive function is discussed in Part
III infra. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 14, at 7-9.
18. "Utility" refers to the individual's valuation of the benefits of a good or seriice.
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uals, 0 and there are no significant technological constraints on the geo-
graphic area or number of persons benefited.
20
Given these characteristics, it is not feasible to reach optimal allo-
cation through the private market. Each individual will have little
incentive to purchase his own public goods and services but rather will
rely on others to acquire amounts which will necessarily accrue to his
own benefit. Thus, while the "invisible hand" of the market auto-
matically leads to efficient allocation of private goods and services,
the allocation of public goods and services requires some political
process whereby individuals can be induced to reveal their true prefer-
ences and compelled to contribute to public revenues accordingly.2 1
Despite numerous attempts to develop methods for realizing this
norm,22 substantial practical difficulties leave the public sector model
largely where it began-a "purely" conceptual solution.
In addition to this distinction between purely private and purely
public allocational processes, there are also substantial differences in
outcome. In the private sector, individuals can consume different
amounts of goods and services but must pay the same price for con-
suming the same amount. These different consumption levels reflect
two factors: differences in individual preferences for various goods and
services,23 and differences in aggregate income. While in the public
19. "Benefits" refers to the objective attributes of the good or service itself. Thus,
all individuals receive identical benefits from a given amount of a good or service,
while different individuals may derive different utility from that given amount.
20. The classic example of a pure public good is national defense. The utility that
a given individual derives from a given level of military preparedness does not reduce
the benefits available to all others; it is impossible to exclude specific persons from
such protection; there are no technological constraints on geographic benefit area
(only political choices as to national boundaries); and the benefits available to each
individual do not decrease as the number of persons within the nation increases.
21. Difficulties in defining methods for financing and producing "correct" amounts
of pure public goods and services have long preoccupied economists. Musgrave's classic
work, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE, provides a comprehensive historical summary in
the context of modern economic analysis, along with copious bibliographical material.
R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 14, at 61-201.
Using concepts developed in traditional microeconomic theory, a solution to the ques.
tion of proper financing and production levels was first given its modern formulation
by Samuelson in The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV. ECON. & SrA'rT. 87
(1954). See also Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Pure Theory of Public Ex.
penditures, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955).
22. See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963): J. BU-
CHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LoICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONsTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE
(1953); A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967). Illustrative articles on this subject are
Birdsall, A Study of the Demand for Public Goods, in ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 235
(R. Musgrave ed. 1965); Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, I1 Pun, CHOICE 17
(1971); Davis and Haines, A Political Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditure: Tile
Case of Municipalities, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 259 (1966); Demsetz, The Exchange and En.
forcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAw & ECON. 11 (1964).
23. One private sector equilibrium condition is that for a given individual the
marginal utility is the same for the last unit of each good and service consumed. if
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sector all individuals must consume the same amount of a pure public
good or service, they may nevertheless contribute different amounts
toward its cost. This latter feature results from the fact that-at least
in theory24-each individual contributes to the cost of the pure public
good or service that portion of his income which he would be willing to
spend 5 on the amount of the good or service he receives, having been
"forced" by appropriate political processes to reveal his true prefer-
ences. These different payments thus reflect different preferences,
while the availability of equivalent benefits stems from the nature of
the goods and services themselves. Consequently, the fact that some
individuals pay more than others for the same amount of public goods
and services need not represent an in-kind redistribution of income.2
B. Allocation of Local Public Goods and Services
While these concepts are convenient for analytical purposes, it is
apparent that very few public goods and services are "pure." Although
the services provided by local government exhibit some of the col-
lective characteristics attributed to pure public services,2 none is
this is not the case, the individual will exchange the last unit of the good from
which he derives lower marginal utility for more of the good with higher marginal
utility. However, the consumption mix that meets this condition may differ from
consumer to consumer.
24. See p. 94 supra. Moreover, tax law, as it has developed, requires a standard
of "equal treatment of equals" in terms of the relevant tax base, but not in terms of"marginal utilities." See note 23 supra. Nevertheless, a systcm of proportional taxation
can be viewed as embodying the notion that the preference for each public good and
service relative to the consumption of all others is a constant; a system of progressive
taxation can be viewed as embodying the notion that that preference ratio increases
as income increases. But see W. BLUm & H. KALVEx, TiE UN AsY C.sE FOR OGRESocStV
TAXATION (1953).
25. The condition that each individual contribute his marginal valuation of the
last unit of each service received times the total quantity received is sufficient to yield
a Pareto optimal solution. This standard was first suggested by Erik Lindahl in DIE
GERECHTICKErr DER BESTEUERUNG (Lund 1919), as translated and reprinted as Just Taxa-
tion-A Positive Solution, in C.AsssCS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINAcE 163 (Musgrave
& Peacock eds. 1958). This is not, however, a necessary condition. As shown by
Johansen, Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Determination of Public Expendi-
tures, 4 INT'L EcoN. REv. 346 (1963), a Pareto optimal solution will exist for an) scheme
of taxation. Consequently, an optimal allocation of public goods and services does not
require a particular financing scheme. Nevertheless, to the extent that the tax structure
deviates from the standard suggested by Lindahl, some redistribution of income will
take place. This latter, of course, may be consistent with the redistributive objectives
of the society or may be offset by other redistributive programs.
26. Redistributive questions are treated in Part III infra.
27. For example, an educated populace is vital to a properly functioning democracy.
since it fosters enlightened political participation and opportunities for individual
economic mobility; it also contributes substantially to aggregate economic growth. Each
individual has access to these benefits and cannot be excluded from enjo)ing them. The
benefits of crime and fire prevention, and reduced risk of personal injury and property
loss, accrue to all persons within service areas. Similarly, collective benefits are derived
from a healthy and sanitary community, since each individual's risk of illness is re-
duced if his neighbors remain healthy. For a discussion of these as well as other munici-
pal services, see, e.g., C. SHoUP, supra note 14, at 101-44.
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purely public: Collective benefits accrue to limited geographic areas,28
and certain local public services possess "private" characteristics en-
joyed independently by each individual.29 Consequently, the provision
of local public goods and services is often characterized by geographic
and individual inequalities."0
In his classic article, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 31
Charles Tiebout demonstrated that precisely this discriminatory (exclu-
sionary) potential facilitates a market solution to the allocation of such
goods and services, despite their public attributes. While his model
only crudely approximates "real world" processes, the Tiebout Fly-
pothesis has been widely accepted as a starting point for much of local
public finance theory. With slight modifications,3 2 it provides the basis
for the ensuing analysis.
The model is founded on three key assumptions:3 3 complete rcsi-
dential mobility, no cost or benefit spillovers between communities,
and no employment considerations which affect locational choice.-'
Moreover, income distribution is regarded as a non-issue.,3
Given these assumptions (and one other relating to economies of
scale)'3 the model postulates that allocative responsibility is given to
28. As is apparent, the goods and services mentioned at note 27 supra do not neces-
sarily benefit wide geographic areas.
29. The public attributes of local public goods and services arc reinforced by the
system of "free" provision. Thus, certain goods and services readily allocated by the
private sector are nevertheless provided by the public sector on grounds that all persons
are better off if each person has access to them.
Given the substantial private benefits inherent in municipal services, this system of
"free" provision is not essential. It may operate alongside, or be replaced by, a sys-
tem of private allocation. Thus, private schools, private recreational or cultural facili-
ties, and private health services are commonplace.
30. See C. SHOUP, supra note 14, at 101-44.
31. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956). Tie-
bout refined his model in An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization, in l'UBLIc
FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION 79 (National Bureau of Economic Research
ed. 1961).
32. See note 36 infra.
33. In his original article, Tiebout relied on seven assumptions: full mobility and
willingness to move, full knowledge of choices, a large number of communities to choose
from, no restrictions due to employment considerations, no spillovers of costs or bente-
fits, a technologically determined optimal community size for each service, and at.
tempts to realize that size. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, supra note
31, at 419.
34. This assumption raises two sets of questions. First, employment considerations
may confine the feasible range of choices open to an individual to a given community
or metropolitan area. As such, they represent an additional barrier to mobility. See
pp. 103-04 infra. On the other hand, a recent critique of the Tiebout Hypothesis has
suggested that private sector employment considerations may cause the results generated
under the Tiebout process, even in its purest form, to be inefficient. Buchanan and
Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J.
PUB. ECON. 25 (1972). See pp. 106-08 inIra.
35. See Part III infra for discussion of this issue.
36. As indicated at note 33 supra, Tiebout assumes that there is a technologically
determined optimal community size for each type of service, and that each community
seeks to realize that size. In the present context, however, it is convenient to disregard
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political units3 7 whose boundaries coincide with the benefit area for the
good or service provided, a "benefit area" being that region in which
the good or service is purely public.38 Consequently, all individuals
within a single political unit will have access to the same level of bene-
fits; all those outside the unit will receive no benefits whatsoever. 3 The
various political units will provide and charge for 40 differing amounts
of the good or service. In a process analogous to "shopping in the mar-
ketplace, '" 4 ' each individual, presented with a range of choices as to
prices and quantities, will locate so as to maximize his utility with re-
spect to the consumption of local public goods and services.42 Thus, the
individual reveals his preferences through his locational decision.43
The result will approach optimal allocation of resources as the number
and variety of alternative communities increases.
While there will be no per capita inequalities within political units,
inequalities among units are fundamental.4 Given these inequalities,
each individual can and must choose his level of consumption and
expenditure by residing where he obtains his preferred mix of munici-
pal services. In effect, judicially-imposed per capita equality removes
this choice,45 thereby imposing substantial allocative inefficiencies. In
scale considerations temporarily, and to assume that size is determined by the benefit
area for the specific local public good or service distributed by the particular political
unit. Under this assumption, there can be no inequalities within political units. This
permits a clear-cut exposition of the impact of a standard of per capita equality as
applied to independent political units. The possibility of intra-unit inequalities is
treated at pp. 98-103 infra.
37. Any political body which has the authority to levy taxes and distribute goods
or services may be considered a political unit, including special purpose units such
as school districts. Special assessment districts may also be viewed as political units.
See note 61 infra.
38. But see notes 28-29 supra.
39. These features are seldom found in reality. See pp. 100-03 in ra for discussion of
deviations from the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between political unit
and benefit area boundaries.
40. Tiebout never expressly addressed the issue of how local public goods and services
should be financed. By analogy to the private sector, each individual should pay the
same flat-rate user charge per unit of good or service received. Yet such goods and
services are public within benefit areas and arguably should be financed accordingly.
As suggested at note 25 supra, the method of financing within benefit areas is not
tied directly to the question of optimal allocation. However, the method of financing
will have a substantial bearing on a variety of distributional issues. See pp. 115-21
infra.
The method by which local public goods and services are financed may also in-
fluence the efficiency properties of the Tiebout process itself and will have a marked
impact on individual incentives. See pp. 106-08, 113-15 infra.
41. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, supra note 31, at 42.
42. Hereinafter generally referred to simply as "municipal services."
43. See p. 94 supra.
44. Under the Tiebout Hypothesis, inequalities would not arise if all individuals
chose to purchase the same quantity of any given local public good or service.
45. In Mclnnis, this factor provided a justification for the court's refusal to interfere
with the Illinois system of financing public education. "[L]ocal citizens must select
which municipal services they value most highly. While some communities might place
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the absence of income transfers,4" a standard of per capita equality
simply requires some units to purchase more, and some less, of each
municipal service. While the resulting uniform levels may meet the
desires of some individuals, most people will be forced to accept a non-
optimal consumption mix.
II. Deviations from the Model
If the Tiebout Hypothesis perfectly mirrored reality, judicial inter-
vention would be manifestly unwarranted, at least on allocative
grounds. 47 However, as with other theoretical constructs, the assump-
tions underlying the model do not fully portray actual conditions.
These deviations must be explored in assessing the validity of impli-
cations drawn from the model.
A. Variations in Political Boundaries
The model assumes a one-to-one relationship between political unit
and benefit area boundaries.48 In other words, it assumes that every
individual within a political unit has access to the same level of munici-
pal services, and that none of their benefits accrue to those outside the
political unit.
In practice, this one-to-one relationship is seldom realized. A single
political unit is likely to provide some municipal services for multiple
benefit areas, while a single benefit area for other services is likely to
encompass more than one political unit. Thus, it is necessary to ex-
heavy emphasis on schools, others may cherish police protection or improved roads."
293 F. Supp. at 333.
In Serrano, the court expressly declined to reach the question of whether independent
choice of consumption patterns would be appropriate. "We need not decide whether
such decentralized financial decision-making is a compelling state interest, since under
the present financing system such fiscal free-will is a cruel illusion for the poor school
districts." 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. This passage im-
plies that, given sufficient financial aid to poorer districts, presumably in the forn
of fiscal capacity equaliiation, see pp. 115-21 infra, independent choice would be
acceptable. It is not clear why the court refused simply to state this proposition,
particularly in light of its reliance on the work of Coons, Clune and Sugarman, supra
note 9. Part of the reason may lie in its treatment of education as a fundanental
interest. In the context of the court's doctrinal concern over the unique and ftnda.
mental character of education, a system permitting deviation from a standard of
state-wide equality might appear to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court It
Rodriguez, untroubled by this anomaly, expressly allowed (although it did not require)
some form of fiscal capacity equalization. 337 F. Supp. at 284. These issues are dis.
cussed at pp. 109-11 infra.
46. See Part III infra.
47. Alternative grounds are discussed in Part III infra. In addition, introduction of
private sector locational considerations may cause inefficiencies. See pp. 106.08 infra.
48. See pp. 96-97 supra.
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amine the efficiency implications of such deviations, and determine
whether they justify imposition of a standard of per capita equality.
1. Spillovers
Benefit spillovers occur where the benefit area for a public good
or service extends beyond the boundaries of the local political unit
responsible for its distribution. This commonly results when non-
residents enter the political unit and make use of the goods and services
it provides.49 Spillovers may also result from the nature of the good or
service itself,50 or from the emigration of recipients of education-
related services.51 These benefit spillovers are paralleled by cost spill-
overs. For example, local taxes may be passed on to non-resident users.52
There is considerable dispute whether such spillovers lead to an under-
or over-allocation of resources to municipal services.53 Nevertheless, it
is generally acknowledged that in theory they lead to a non-optimal
allocation of resources and that in practice they may cause substantial
inefficiencies.
Resolution of such spillover problems requires some method for
internalizing costs and benefits within each political unit. While the
specific elements of any particular solution are often complex, spill-
over inefficiencies are best remedied by intergovernmental transfers,
user charges, or redefinition of political boundaries.r' In any case,
49. For example, while within a political unit non-residents may travel on its
streets, make use of its cultural and recreational facilities, and be protected by its
police and fire departments.
50. The impact of health- and safety-related services is not readily confined to
political boundaries. For example, reducing the risk of contagious disease in one unit
will have similar effects in neighboring units. Insofar as education reduces crime, in-
creases social stability, and the like, its benefits will also spread beyond political unit
boundaries.
51. Education spillovers may be particularly substantial in that many adult residents
may have been educated elsewhere (spill-ins) and many current students may reside
elsewhere as adults (spill-outs).
52. Other types of cost spillovers also exist. For example, if a political unit in-
creases its crime prevention efforts, it may cause criminals to pursue their actisities in
neighboring units.
In addition to this allocative effect, spillovers may also cause a redistribution of
income. Thus, while the evidence is not clear, it is often asserted that central cities
are exploited in the sense that they provide services enjoyed, but not paid for, by
suburban residents. Of course, these benefit spillovers must be balanced against %arious
cost spillovers before assessing the extent and direction of this form of exploitation. For
a recent study of Detroit which concludes that net spillouts, while the)' do exist. may
be less than normally assumed, see Neenan, Suburban.Central City Exploitation Thesis:
One City's Tale, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 117 (1970).
53. See, e.g., Williams, The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local
Government, 74 J. POL. EcoN. 18 (1966); Brainard & Dolbear, The Possibility of Over-
supply of Local Public Goods: A Critical Note, 75 J. POL. EcoN. 91 (1967); Williams, The
Possibility of Oversupply of Public Goods: A Rejoinder, 75 J. PoL. Eco . 91 (1957);
Pauly, Optimality, Public Goods, and Local Govennents: A General Theoretical Analysis,
78 J. POL. Eco.x. 572 (1970).
54. Spillovers have received a great deal of attention. See, e.g., notes 52-53 supra;
TnE ANALYSIS OF PUBUC OUtrrT (Margolis ed. 1970).
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while they are of great practical consequence, benefit and cost spill-
overs have no direct bearing on inequalities between political units
in the availability of municipal services. Consequently, a judicially-
imposed standard of per capita equality is not likely to constitute an
efficient resolution of the problem.
2. Intraunit Inequalities
For a variety of reasons, it is likely that a given political unit will
contain many benefit areas.55 Situations of intraunit inequality then
become possible, if not inevitable.50 This may merely mean that the
number of choices confronting the individual is not limited to the
number of independent political units: 57 A single unit can offer dif-
ferent "bundles" of municipal services, thereby realizing the gains
derived from unification while simultaneously preserving the situation
that would prevail if the unit were divided into autonomous neighbor-
hoods. Each individual must then locate in that area which most
closely approximates his preferences-in conformity with the basic
model as described in Part I.
Residents of a single political unit, if it is thus to accommodate dif-
ferent aggregate demand levels"s without causing a redistribution of in-
55. It is often possible to realize various technological and administrative economics
of scale by grouping benefit areas into a single political unit, and different components
of a municipal service may have different benefit areas. For example, patrolnu cover
small neighborhoods, while detectives may be involved in city-widc activities; the optimal
size for a secondary school is three to four times that of an elementary school. More.
over, as indicated at notes 28-29 supra, certain local public goods and services have no
necessary geographic dimension other than that imposed by public provision and "free"
access. Finally, political units may reflect social preferences for community size which
bear no relation to allocative considerations. These issues are treated extensively ill C.
SHOUP, supra note 14, at 51-204. See also W. HiRscH, supra note 14, at 167-84. Tiebout
expressly acknowledged such technological considerations in A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, supra note 31, at 419-20. In An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentraliza.
tion, supra note 31, he provided a theoretical discussion of optimal community size In
terms of various technological considerations.
56. Intra-unit inequalities are inevitable with respect to those municipal services
distant from the user. Thus, for example, the further away an individual lives from
a public park, the more costly it is to use that facility. In such a situation, a standard
of per capita equality is meaningless.
57. See p. 104 infra. This increase in the number of alternative choices is partlcu.
larly important once limits on mobility imposed by employment opportunities are
recognized. See note 35 supra.
58. It would, of course, be possible to maintain a standard of aggregate per capita
equality while permitting variations in the composition of the "equivalent bundles.' It
such situations, if the courts focus their attention on the unequal provision of specific
services, they are likely to overlook offsetting inequalities in the _provision of others.
Ostensible equalization may simply introduce or exacerbate inequalities, rather than
eliminate them. A standard of aggregate per capita equality would permit choice among
different "bundles" of comparable magnitude; the alternative would scent to involve
per capita equality for each and every municipal service, not simply those brought to
the attention of the courts by complaining parties.
Ratner, supra note 9, has been one of the few commentators to recognize this issue.
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come,59 must be allowed to alter payments to reflect different amounts
of municipal services. It is precisely this mechanism that is involved
when neighborhoods within a political unit subject themselves to spe-
cial assessments for additional services.60 Residents in a particular
benefit area simply agree to purchase additional municipal services
from their political unit and are taxed accordingly. This is similar to
the situation where one autonomous political unit purchases various
services from another,61 and conforms to the basic model described in
Part I. At the same time, it highlights the impact of a judicially-
imposed standard of per capita equality: That standard either denies
some neighborhoods the right to assess themselves for additional serv-
ices, or requires other neighborhoods to subject themselves to assess-
ments for unwanted amounts.
Similar results obtain if municipal services are provided to benefit
areas on the basis of their contributions to revenues. Such an approach
does not differ in effect from a special assessment procedure, nor from
the result which would obtain if each benefit area functioned as an
autonomous political unit.
2
He "assumes that the equal protection clause requires independent equal protection
with respect to the provision of each basic type of municipal service, so that a city
could not claim constitutional compliance by providing municipal services which were
in some sense equal overall, but unequal neighborhood by neighborhood with respect
to any given service .... " Id. at 40, n.158. Yet he provides no rationale for his as-
sumption and makes no mention of any countervailing considerations.
Schoettle, supra note 10, provides another rationale for not mandating service-by-sen ice
equality, in addition to the notion of allocative efficiency treated in the text. He argues
that there are alternative ways of spending public funds nominally allocated to educa-
tion, and that purchase of related municipal services may enhance educational outputs.
Consequently, mandating strict equality may be technologically inefficient in that
identical sums could be used to attain higher output levels for each member of the
political unit. Id. at 1388-93.
59. See note 25 supra.
60. See note 132 infra.
61. It is not unusual for small, independent political units bordering on larger ones
to purchase services such as sanitation and police and fire protection from the latter.
A neighborhood which subjects itself to special assessments could be viewed as an
autonomous political unit. While the process does not change regardless of classifica-
tion, the status of special assessment districts would be crucial if the courts consider
only intra-unit inequalities. See p. 114 infra.
62. This may have a substantial bearing on the impact of judicial intervention. See
pp. 112-15 infra. In the present context, one difference in these approaches should be
noted. Unlike other situations where the amount provided each benefit area is determined
by a single revenue scheme, the individual benefit areas do not establish their con-
sumption levels independently. The "independent choice" outcome would be dupli-
cated only insofar as the political process was able to define an appropriate revenue
scheme. The most convenient assumption would be that the demand for municipal
services relative to the demand for all other goods and services does not change as
income changes. In this, case, it would be appropriate to levy a proportional tax and
distribute municipal services to each benefit area in direct ratio to its contribution to
revenues. In effect, local public goods and services would be financed as pure public
goods and services within benefit areas; between benefit areas they would be financed
as private goods and services. See note 29 supra. On the other hand, in a situation of
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Indeed it would seem that, all other things equal, 3 allocation of
municipal services to benefit areas on the basis of each area's financial
contribution-whether that contribution takes place through special
assessments or through a centralized system of taxation-represents the
efficient approach. 64 In response, it might be argued that benefit areas
within a political unit are seldom well defined,oa and that consequently
it will be extremely difficult to develop an accurate balance between
financial contributions and the benefits derived from provision of
municipal services. 06 Yet per capita equalization is hardly an appropri-
ate means of dealing with this difficulty.
0 7
Furthermore, if private real estate markets are operating properly,
some-if not all-of any imbalance between contributions and benefits
will be compensated for through capitalization of the excess cost or
value of municipal services into the price of land. Where taxes equal
benefits, net capitalization will be zero. But where taxes are higher or
lower than the benefits associated with the property,08 the price of
land will be correspondingly lowered or raised.0 Consequently a resi-
perfect mobility the choice of a particular revenue scheme is not important, since each
individual is selecting a consumption mix which meets his desires and this latter
process itself preserves independent choice.
63. As discussed in Part III infra, there are clearly questions of an in.kind redistribu-
tion of income involved.
64. But see note 25 supra. In effect, the revenue scheme sets a "price" and individuals
then respond accordingly.
65. The situation is further complicated by the fact that municipal services possess
both private and public benefit characteristics, see notes 28-29 supra, and the level of
private benefits desired by any individual may differ substantially from that individual's
demand for public benefits. Thus, for example, the private benefits from a public school
are confined to those families who send their children to that school. But the benefit
area for the public attributes of the education the school provides-such as increased
social stability, a more enlightened citizenry, and increased social productivity-may af-
fect a much larger area. Consequently, an individual may desire one type of education
for himself and another for individuals in the community at large. His contribution to
revenues will go to provide both types of benefits, and exclusive attention to either
would lead to a misallocation of resources.
66. It might also be argued that allowing intra-unit inequalities would provide an
opportunity for political abuse, given the difficulties in determining whether con-
tributions to revenues within any given area correspond accurately to benefits re-
ceived. That is, it might provide an opportunity for politically powerful segments of
the community to secure disproportionate amounts of services. But see note 70 infra.
67. Just as in the case of inter-unit spillovers, pp. 99-100 supra, there is no reason
to believe that apparent equality in the direct provision of services would necessarily
lead to equality in the actual costs and benefits enjoyed by different areas. And even
if it did, of course, the result would be less desirable on efficiency grounds than an
approach that provided a broader range of choice. Nor would an attempt at imposing
per capita equality eliminate the problem of political abuse mentioned in note 66
supra, since the core problem would presumably remain-the inability to compare with
accuracy the aggregate value of the benefits received by different areas and thus to
determine with certainty whether any favoritism was involved.
68. Local taxes which are not tied to location, such as the sales tax and the city
earnings tax, will not be capitalized into residential property values but will stay with
the individual as a constant regardless of where he resides within the political unit.
69. See Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Properly
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77
J. POL. EcoN. 957 (1969); Smith, Property Tax Capitalization in San Francisco, 23 NAT L
TAx J. 177 (1970).
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dent will pay, either through rent or taxes or both, an amount
roughly equal to the value of the municipal services he receives. And
this, in turn, will result in the efficient allocation of those services.-
As a final point, it should be noted that if the courts mandate
intra-unit equalization without controlling inter-unit disparities, there
will be an increased incentive for wealthier individuals to form their
own political units. In the long run this may accentuate rather than
diminish the overall pattern of inequality. Such incentive effects will
be explored in greater detail below. 1
B. Barriers to Mobility
In order for the system to function properly, individuals must be
willing and able to express their preferences by moving. Consequently,
substantial barriers to residential mobility impose an obvious limi-
tation on the model.7 2 These barriers take many forms. Imperfect
knowledge, an insufficient range of available choices, lack of employ-
ment opportunities, transactions costs, and racial discrimination are
considered below; economic barriers such as exclusionary zoning are
treated separately in Part III.
I. Imperfect Knowledge, Insufficient Choices, Employment Barriers,
and Transactions Costs
These factors presumably combine to prevent realization of an effi-
cient allocation. However, they do not imply that the model should
be discarded in favor of a system of per capita equality.
First, reliance on such a system would only exacerbate the problems
posed by imperfect knowledge. In effect, it would transform municipal
services into pure public services: By ignoring individual preferences
under decentralized distribution, it would become necessary to deter-
70. Allocative efficiency will result from the fact that, given an), geographic pattern
of local public goods and services, each individual will seek to reside at a point where
the local taxes plus the net capitalization of the value of services into the price he
pays for his residence equals the marginal value of those services to him. (Or. more
generally, he will seek to reside where the price he pays for his home plus his taxes
equals the marginal value to him of the residence and the services associated with it.)
See note 25 supra. The fact that part of the price an individual pays for local public
goods and services may go, not to the government, but rather to the person from
whom he buys or rents his home does not necessarily affect this result. It might,
however, have an effect on the distribution of income. When additional services are
provided to an area without a corresponding increase in taxes, property values in that
area will go up and current landowners will receive a windfall gain.
Note that it is the windfall gains described here that are the subject of the po.
tential political abuses mentioned in note 66 supra. Consequently, only those owners
at the time of the initial abuse will benefit. Subsequent residents will be forced to
pay for the additional benefits they receive.
71. See pp. 113-15 infra.
72. See the list of assumptions relied on by Tiebout, note 33 supra.
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mine such preferences through one combined political process.1 3
Like any centralized decision-making process, this involves information
costs avoided in the private market through the direct exercise of indi-
vidual preferences.
74
Second, in a finite world, the number of alternative mixes of munici-
pal services is limited. This situation is further aggravated by employ-
ment considerations which prevent the individual from simply choos-
ing his preferred mix of services. 75 However, reliance on a standard
of per capita equality would not resolve these difficulties; rather, it
would simply restrict choice even further.
Finally, while transactions costs do have an impact on relocation
decisions, they represent simply one element of total cost-an element
which is common to all purchases, both public and private. There
are, of course, individuals at the margin who will choose to pay the
total costs associated with selection of a particular level of municipal
services; efficiency criteria suggest that they be allowed to do so.
While the conclusion might be different if transactions costs effec-
tively eliminated residential mobility,"0 individuals in fact move quite
frequently.77 Admittedly, this mobility occurs in response to employ-
ment opportunities and neighborhood characteristics, as well as in
response to the availability of municipal services;78 nonetheless, it does
indicate that transactions cost barriers to mobility are not over-
whelming.
73. See p. 94 supra.
74. The marketplace model of the private sector also assumes perfect knowledge,
and deviations cause difficulties comparable to those under the Tiebout Hypothesis. In
both cases, however, each individual can improve his well-being by increasing his
knowledge of available alternatives, and consequently has incentives to do so.
75. This difficulty is partially mitigated by permitting intraunit disparities. See pp.
100-03 supra.
76. Even if no individual ever changed his place of residence, it could still be main.
tained that local political autonomy as a value in itself justifies leaving decisions as to
the consumption of municipal services to the local community. Where the courts have
hesitated to call for per capita equality, it has largely been to preserve such autonomy.
See, e.g., Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620; Robinson,
287 A.2d at 214; Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 284; Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. at 876.
77. For example, between March 1969 and March 1970, over 19 per cent of all
individuals changed residence; the average tenure in a single residence was sixty-three
months. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MOBILITY OF POPUIATION IN TilE UNITED STATES-
MARCH 1969 TO MARCH 1970, P-20 No. 210, at 7 (January 15, 1970).
78. Even if it were assumed that individuals initially decided to relocate in order
to exploit employment opportunities or to reside with a particular social group, tills
would not undermine the local public sector locational processes described above.
Rather, once a decision to relocate had been made on the basis of private sector
considerations, the individual would then select that place of residence meeting those
needs and also conforming most closely to his preferences for municipal services. In
practice, there will be trade-offs among location-related factors. An individual may
forego private sector preferences in order to attain public sector wants. Thus, in making
a locational decision, each individual will maximize his welfare simultaneously with
respect to employment opportunities, neighborhood characteristics, and constmption of
municipal services. Note, however, that this process may generate inefficiencies as
described at pp. 106-08 infra.
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2. Racial Discrimination
Racially motivated barriers to residential mobility0° also influence the
distribution of municipal services. If members of a racial minority are
prohibited from residing in a political unit completely, or are limited
to circumscribed areas of the unit, 0 it is then possible to force that
group to accept undesired levels of municipal services. These levels
may be either too high or too low, and such a policy may or may not
benefit other members of the political unit. It will, however, prevent
individual members of the disfavored group from choosing to "pur-
chase," via locational decisions, desired levels of services." If the minor-
ity is confined to limited sections of a single political unit, it is also
possible that others within that unit are "expropriating" resources con-
tributed by the former. 8
2
By removing such barriers, the courts will enhance the welfare of
the victims of discrimination: Opportunities for choice will be in-
creased, and it will no longer be possible to expropriate resources
contributed by the minority residents. Insofar as the elimination of
these barriers merely expands the range of choices, the economic well-
being of other residents will not be reduced.8 3 Where the elimination
of barriers reduces the level of expropriation, it does impose a cost on
others-but a cost which the courts should not be reluctant to demand.
79. Problems of income-based restraints on mobility are considered in Part Ill infra.
80. See, e.g., K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CriEs: RESIDENTLL SEGREGATION
AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1965).
81. On the basis of the capitalization concept treated at pp. 102-03 supra. the munici-
pal services provided minority areas will be distributed efficiently among the residents re-
gardless of whether the total amount is optimal.
82. Property owners may also derive excess profits from the existence of a separate
housing market.
83. Racial integration, without more, will not reduce the amounts of municipal
services formerly available in segregated communities. If racial integration brings with
it integration by income, however, the situation is somewhat changed. See Part 11I
infra. Shifting demand patterns, resulting from increased mobility, may also affect
real estate prices.
If individuals prefer to live in racially segregated communities, then their welfare is
reduced if racial barriers are removed. This may also cause a reduction in property
values and thereby impose a secondary monetary cost. Nonetheless, both courts and
the legislatures have gone quite far in striking down overt racial barriers to mobility.
See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), relying on the Ci, il Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). It is difficult to assess the "efficiency" of these
decisions from an economic perspective, since they impose a cost on one group while
benefiting another, and neither the costs nor the benefits are easily quantified. Indeed.
the whole issue may better be viewed as a question of the definition of property rights,
and hence of the distribution of income. See Calabresi & Melaned, Property Rules.
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 'ieu of the Cathedral, 85 HARnv. L. REV. 1089.
1098 (1972). From a purely allocative standpoint, alternative approaches would be to
permit complete mobility but compensate those perceiving themselves as damaged
thereby, or to permit segregated neighborhoods but require residents to maintain that
situation by "buying off" those seeking entry. Yet practical and moral difficulties in
establishing appropriate prices, high transactions costs, the "free-rider" problem. and
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, would render these monetary solutions un-
tenable.
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It may be urged that "open housing" is a long-term if not an un-
attainable goal, and that the courts must therefore intervene directly
in the distribution patterns for municipal services. This argument has
considerable force in the context of exploitative racial discrimination,
and some judicial adjustment of distribution patterns may be required.
But a standard of per capita equality still seems inappropriate. In the
ory, effective intervention would require that the courts first deter-
mine the consumption preferences of, and revenue contributions by,
minority groups. Given the impossibility of deriving such information,
it is convenient to assume equivalence between all racial groups of the
same income class. It then becomes reasonable to impose a standard
of per capita equality only as between these groups.8
4
The only alternative to equalization by income class is across-the-
board equality, a standard which is generally undesirable for the rea-
sons explored above.85 A solution other than these two-that is, an
approach which would upgrade the services available to minorities to
a level which is either above or below that prevailing for all others of
comparable income-would, in the short run, simply perpetuate dis-
parities based solely on race,86 leaving the courts in a difficult position
in terms of doctrine and equity. In the long run, market forces would




In developing his model, Tiebout assumed that each individual was
living on unearned income,"" and that he could therefore ignore pri-
vate sector locational considerations. Moreover, while describing the
84. Even this approach would pose substantial measurement difficulties in situations
where there was no stratification by income. Presumably, it would be necessary to
derive some average availability figure.
85. See pp. 95-98 supra.
86. In those cases involving equalization by race, see note 11 supra, the courts
have not directly confronted this dilemma. Presumably, this has been because the
white areas of town were receiving uniform levels of services. However, these suits
have involved small towns, with the exception of Norwalk CORE (where equalization was
between whites and non-whites of the same economic class) and Hobson (where the
court implicitly called for a standard of per capita equality regardless of racial con.
siderations). As suits challenging distribution patterns in large cities begin to arise,
it is unlikely that the courts will be able to avoid this issue.
87. This could result, in part, from the operation of private real estate markets. Pre-
sumably, those areas which were upgraded would increase in value, and the relatively
low income residents would be "driven" back into areas with lower service levels, The
courts would then be faced with the choice of re-imposing their standard, or allowing
the equalization by income class to remain in effect. Repeated choice of the former would
ultimately lead to per capita equality.
88. See note 33 supra.
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means by which municipal services were distributed, Tiebout never
explicitly examined appropriate funding arrangements.s"
In a recent article, James Buchanan and Charles Goetz suggest
that these two factors may detract from the efficiency of the equilib-
rium reached under the processes Tiebout described. 0 The difficulties
arise largely from the existence of "fiscal externalities." That is, the
movement of an individual into or out of a community may impose
on the other members of that community a net gain (external
benefit) or loss (external cost) with respect to the municipal serv-
ices they enjoy. For example, the individual may contribute to local
taxes without requiring the production of any additional goods and
services-as would be the case if the goods and services were purely
public within the community. 91 In that case, his presence would simply
reduce the tax bill of all the other residents. Conversely, the com-
munity he leaves will suffer a reduction in tax revenues without a
corresponding reduction in the cost of the pure local public goods
and services. Alternatively, if the goods and services involved were
not purely public, in-migration could have a "congestion effect." That
is, the individual's presence could reduce the benefits available to all
other individuals to a degree not offset by his contribution to rev-
enues. 92 Yet, in choosing a community in which to reside, the individ-
ual will generally ignore these costs and benefits he confers on others
and will simply locate where the value he derives from municipal serv-
ices and from private sector activities-such as employment-is at a
combined maximum. The result will be a non-optimal distribution of
the population, since it would be possible to enhance the welfare of
everyone by altering the individual's choice.0
3
The only way to avoid these inefficiencies is to develop a means
whereby the individual is forced to take account of his effect on others.
Buchanan and Goetz suggest that this will occur only if the political
unit can engage in discriminatory taxation to recover the differential
gains enjoyed by various individuals as a result of their location.04 It
is unlikely, however, that any local government would, or even could,
develop such a system of taxation.
89. See note 40 supra and pp. 115-21 infra.
90. Buchanan & Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the
Tiebout Model, 1 J. PuB. EcoN. 25 (1972).
91. See the discussion of purely public goods at pp. 93-95 supra.
92. Such fiscal externalities are discussed in another context at pp. 115.21 infra.
,93. As Buchanan and Goetz note, the inefficiencies are to some extent related to
the existence of differences among political units in terms of the private sector opportuni-
ties available to an individual.
94. Buchanan & Goetz, supra note 90, at 34-39.
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However, it does not appear that this difficulty, any more than the
real-world deviations from the other assumptions underlying the Tie-
bout model, justifies a standard of per capita equality. 90 Equalization
would resolve cost externalities problems only with centralized fi-
nancing,9 6 would not alleviate congestion externalities in the case of
impure local public goods,0 7 and would eliminate efficiencies gener-
ated by the choice mechanism. This seems to be the view of Buchanan
and Goetz, who conclude by suggesting that the virtues of the Tiebout-
process are to be preferred
if the alternative to fiscal decentralization in the provision of
spacially-limited nonexcludable goods and services should be in-
creased fiscal concentration at central government levels.9
III. Inequalities of Income
We have proceeded thus far on the assumption that the distribution
of income is to be accepted as given. Substantial inequalities do exist,
however, and they have considerable impact on the distribution of
municipal services.
A. In-Kind Redistribution
The clear implication of the Tiebout Hypothesis is that "unequal"
distribution of municipal services enhances each individual's welfare
by permitting, indeed requiring, independent choice of consumption
levels. Without more, judicial imposition of a standard of per capita
equality has the effect-although presumably not the purpose-of re-
ducing the welfare of all individuals. Why, then, do equalization suits
arise? The answer is that the groups petitioning for equalization are
seeking a redistribution of income, which will occur when the com-
plaining group bears less than the full costs of equalization.
Generally, in-kind transfers are an inefficient method of redistribu-
95. Although Buchanan and Goetz do not discuss the point, it would appear that the
capitalization process described at pp. 102-03 supra would operate on an inter-unit as
well as an intra-unit basis, and consequently would act to mitigate the inefficiencies
described above.
96. With an equal level of services in all communities and centralized financing, neither
the services received by an individual nor the payment for them would be affected by
the movements of any other individual.
97. An equal level of services with centralized financing would presumably eliminate
all incentives to relocate in response to public sector considerations. However, in re-
locating in response to private sector considerations, the individual still would not con-
sider the congestion effects of his decision.
98. Buchanan & Goetz, supra note 90, at 40.
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tion. That is, assuming the amount of the transfer has been fixed, all
those involved would prefer that it occur in the form of a straight cash
payment, rather than through a judicially-imposed standard of per
capita equality. Despite this general rule, there may be grounds for
redistributing certain goods and services under particular circum-
stances.99 Nevertheless, in such instances there is no a priori basis for
using per capita equality as the appropriate redistributive standard.
Moreover, regardless of how it is justified, that standard is likely to be
ineffective, if not counter-productive.
1. Redistributive Standards
Certain local public goods and services may possess particular char-
acteristics justifying deviations from distribution patterns produced
by market forces. In some cases, redistributive claims of this type pro-
vide a persuasive objection to results obtained under the Tiebout
Hypothesis.
Governmental redistribution can be explained in large measure10
on grounds that those relinquishing resources are compensated in some
form other than money or money's worth-be it psychic gratification,
a sense of moral well-being, enhanced social stability, aggregate eco-
nomic growth, or vicarious pleasure derived from consumption by oth-
ers. 01 Such redistribution may involve either money or specific goods
and services. In either case, redistribution is not only consistent with,
but also necessary for, allocative efficiency. The welfare of recipients is
clearly increased, while those relinquishing resources presumably do
so because it is perceived as enhancing their own welfare.102 The choice
of an optimal level of redistribution is therefore open to the same type
of analysis used to determine the proper allocation of resources to other
pure public goods and services. 10 3 Consequently, it is necessary to estab-
99. Inefficiencies may also be disregarded if redistribution per se is accepted as alegitimate judicial function though it is acknowledged that the courts cannot compel
outright dollar transfers. A standard of per capita equality may then be 'iewed as a
second best alternative.
100. Perhaps the most plausible alternative to the explanation which follows is
that a coalition of lower income individuals and the well-intentioned wealthy impose a
redistributive scheme on the rest of society. While this process also pla)s a role in
reality, it is disregarded here on the assumption that it provides no independent justifi.
cation for judicial intervention. At a minimum, it is presumed that the courts must
find some rationale for acting out their good intentions.
101. Thus, viewed from this perspective, there is no "redistribution" invohed in the
sense that the total welfare of one group is enhanced at the expense of the total weIfare
of another group. Rather, one is simply taking account of the public benefit areas for
particular goods and services.
102. See note 100 supra.
103. See, e.g., Thurrow, The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good. 85 Q.J.
ECON. 328 (1971). While approaching the question fron a somewhat similar perspective.
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lish a political process for determining the appropriate extent and form
of redistribution. 04 Viewed from this perspective, the optimal pattern
of distribution is an allocative problem requiring a political solution,
and there is no basis for judicial intervention in the redistributive
process.
It may be argued, however, that certain distributional standards have
been placed outside the realm of politics, and that the courts are re-
sponsible for their enforcement. Thus, it may be asserted that each in-
dividual has a fundamental right to certain goods and services apart
from the momentary interests of the rest of the society in providing
them. 0 5 The basis for this assertion must, however, go to the character
of a particular good or service, and not to the process of allocation.
A particular allocative process is introduced in the first instance for
reasons of efficiency; there is no a priori basis for asserting that those
goods and services typically provided by local governments are neces-
sarily the same goods and services to which each person has a funda-
mental claim. 00
Judicial intervention must therefore be predicated on a finding that
the character of a particular good or service is such that all individuals
have a right to its enjoyment. But this is only the beginning. It then
becomes necessary to specify an appropriate mandatory distribution
pattern.
There are two basic alternatives: a guaranteed minimum or per
capita equality.'0 7 In choosing between the two, the particular char-
Hochman & Rogers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 Ast. ECON. REv. 542 (1969), argue
that private market-type bargaining arrangements could lead to an optimal solution,
Nonetheless, they do acknowledge some need for a supervening authority to regulate tile
process. It would appear that a political process would be necessary as the number of
persons involved increased beyond their hypothetical two-person community. See Gold.
farb, Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Comment, 60 Ass. Eco,. REV. 994 (1970); Polinsky,
Shortsightedness and Nonmarginal Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 61 Ass. EcoNI. REV. 972
(1971).
104. See pp. 93-95 supra.
105. See J. RAwI.s, A THEORY OF JusTicE (1971), for an argument that all individuals
should have a fundamental right to certain (very general) "primary goods" which are
essential to any person's well-being.
106. Food, shelter and legal services possess predominantly private characterlstics.
Nonetheless, in some measure these goods are provided to low income persons as part
of a politically determined redistributive process. Many would go one step further and
argue that access to these goods is a fundamental right which should be protected by
the courts. See, e.g., Michelman, The Advent of A Right to Housing: A Current Ap-
praisal, 5 HARV. Civ. RincTs-Civ. Lil. L. REV. 207 (1970).
107. Other possible standards may be based on need and/or on a permissible range
of disparities. The need criterion raises issues identical to those posed by differences in
input/output ratios. See p. 112 infra. For example, the assertion that the educa-
tional needs of low income and minority students are greater than those of their wealthy
white counterparts is simply another way of saying that greater resources are required
to ensure comparable achievement by the former class of students; likewise, greater need
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acteristics of the good or service in question will again be important.
A guaranteed minimum,108 for example, seems most appropriate where
the good or service is enjoyed by each individual independently of the
consumption levels of others. Thus, certain minimum amounts of food
and shelter are necessary simply to insure survival, and they confer
this advantage quite independently of whether or not other persons are
similarly provisioned. 109 Perhaps this factor is also relevant to the guar-
anteed minimum standard implicit in the decisions establishing the
right to counsel in criminal cases.110 On the other hand, a standard
of per capita equality seems most appropriate where the essence of the
right is relational. An obvious example is the right to vote: The
value of one individual's vote has meaning only in relationship to the
value of another's vote. This perhaps provides a rationale for the Su-
preme Court's standard of per capita equality in the "one-man-one
vote" rule."' Sometimes, of course, the appropriate characterization
of a particular good or service is subject to debate. In the context of
municipal services, education provides the most interesting example.
Education may be viewed as a right enjoyed .independently by each
individual: A certain minimum of education-related skills is essential
to "survival" in the society. 12 Alternatively, education may be viewed
as a relational right; the critical factor then is that each individual be
given the same educational opportunities.113
While allocative processes may not be significant in determining
whether access to a particular good or service should be established
as a fundamental right, they do have implications for implementing
a proper standard for redistribution once that determination is made.
Some of these considerations are explored in the next section.
for police protection means simply that greater crime prevention resources are necessary
in certain areas in order to maintain a uniform level of protection.
A permissible range of disparities standard would be based on the notion that relative
disparities are of controlling importance. Thus, for example, this is one basis for a
progressive tax structure. It is doubtful that the courts could define and apply such a
standard directly to the distribution of local public goods and services. Note. howeer,
that in many instances imposition of a minimum standard may be intended, in part.
to limit the range of permissible disparities.
108. Professor Michelman has been the leading proponent of this approach. See
Michelman, supra note 9, at 33.
109. This is the approach embodied in a wide range of governmentally sponsored
transfer programs, including food stamps, welfare payments, housing supplements, and
the like.
110. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
111. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
112. This appears to be the implicit judgment embodied in public educational
finance schemes which provide a flat minimum grant to all districts.
113. This is the viewpoint adopted by a variety of commentators. See note 12 supra.
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2. Ineffective Redistributive Efforts
Whatever the justification for redistribution, reliance on a stand-
ard of per capita equality may wvell be an ineffective,114 if not a coun-
ter-productive, redistributive policy.
a. Input-Output Differences
Commentators have devoted considerable attention to the distinc-
tion between expenditures (inputs) and the quality or value of serv-
ices received (outputs) in the provision of municipal services."' In the
present context,"16 it is sufficient to note that equalization of expen-
ditures will generally result in relatively lower output levels in areas
characterized by high population density, substandard dwellings, and
low income residents." 7 On the other hand, output equalization is
rendered extraordinarily difficult by complex problems of definition
and measurement," 8 and may be impossible to achieve in practice.1"0
b. Who Gets the Gains (Or Takes the Losses)?
As noted above, the net value of municipal services is capitalized
into property values.' 20 Consequently, equalization will cause those
values to change. The nature of such changes will be determined by
various market forces; in general, however, property values will rise in
neighborhoods experiencing a relative increase in services and will
fall in others.
114. The term "inefficient" is used in its strictly economic sense as defined at p. 92
supra. The term "ineffective" relates to the question of whether and to what extent
redistribution favoring the poor occurs, regardless of the efficiency with which it occurs,
115. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 9, at 1-12, 40-42, 48-49; Schoettle, supra note 10, at
1381-82; Note, A Statistical Analysis, supra note 10, at 1315-19; Comment, The Evolution
of Equal Protection, supra note 9, at 175-76. In Hobson and Serrano the courts relied
on input measures (student and teacher placement and expenditures per capita), while
in Norwalk CORE, Hadnot, and Shaw they focused on outputs (effectiveness of services,
and quality and quantity of facilities, respectively). Robinson is the one case involving
education which explicitly treats, albeit briefly, output considerations.
116. For discussion of this issue in other contexts, see notes 153, 154, 156 and 163
infra.
117. This is particularly true of education, police protection, and sanitation. In addi-
tion to authorities cited in note 115 supra, see J. COLEMAN, et al., EQUALITY OF EDuCATION-
AL OPPORTUNITY 312 (1966); W. HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 147-65; ON EqUALTv oF Luu-
CATIONAL OPI'ORTUNITY (Mosteller 9- Moynihan eds. 1972).
118. For example, is educational output defined in terms of test scores, expected
future earnings, or cultural adaptation; and given any such standard, how can it be
applied? Likewise, is police protection defined as the probability of bein a victim
of any given type of crime? Moreover, is equality to be measured in terms of individuals,
or in terms of distribution ranges for groups of individuals?
119. Thus the output of certain local public goods may be at best marginally responsive
to increases in traditional inputs.
120. See pp. 102-03 supra. Note that any change in property values following
equalization will also reflect any alterations in property tax rates necessary to finance
the new pattern of services.
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The consequences of this process are quite complex;'21 the impact
of a standard of per capita equality will vary widely depending on the
factual setting. In any event, however, property owners in upgraded
areas will be primary beneficiaries of the court's largesse' ' through
windfall increases in the value of their property. These gains to cur-
rent owners will be realized through higher rental (or resale) charges.
It is therefore likely that at least some of the persons the courts are
attempting to benefit will be forced to pay for the additional goods and
services they receive. The "winners" may be relatively prosperous
apartment owners rather than their low income tenants. The question
of who is injured by the equalization process is somewhat more un-
certain. Nevertheless, at least some of those hit hardest by reduced
property values are likely to be lower-middle and middle income resi-
dents.
2 3
c. Incentive Effects-Flight to the Suburbs
As explained below, 2 4 an individual's cost for municipal services is
a function of the income and wealth of his neighbors. This fact pro-
vides incentives for individuals to move from poor communities to
wealthy ones, and for wealthy communities to engage in exclusionary
zoning.
If the courts limit themselves to a standard of per capita equality
within political units, these incentives to "suburbanize" will be in-
creased substantially as wealthier individuals seek to increase their con-
sumption of municipal services and to reduce their costs per unit of
consumption. The net result will be a loss to central city residents.'2 5
This counter-productive impact can be avoided only by enforcing a
standard of per capita equality across political boundaries. 20 Con-
121. Similar processes are involved in the introduction and enforcement of housing
codes. Comprehensive treatment of a wide range of issues in that context, whidt could
also be applied to the equalization of municipal services, is contained in Ackerman.
Regulating Slum Housing on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies
and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
12-29. It is assumed that the owners are not required to bear the costs of equalization.
123. Moreover, none of the judicial opinions to date appear to have specified how.-
equalization is to be financed. If various political units resort to highly regressive tax
measures, the burden on lower-middle and middle income groups may be particularly
harsh.
124. See pp. 115-21 infra.
195. Lower income central city residents benefit by the presence of upper income
residents insofar as it enables the former to reduce their own costs for municipal
services. This process was given a precise formulation in Buchanan, Principles of Urban
Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUBLIC CHOICE 2 (1971).
126. Alternatively, it would be necessary to alter the financing scheme so as to
require suburban contributions to central city revenues. See pp. 115-21 infra.
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sequently, the courts cannot adopt a "degree" of change; they are faced
with an all-or-nothing situation.
d. Incentive Effects-Resort to Private Markets
Certain municipal services are susceptible to private market dis-
tribution, either directly through individual purchases 12 1 or indirectly
through special assessment financing. 128 For high income groups, re-
sort to these mechanisms may be preferable to maintaining widespread
per capita equality at high levels throughout the public sector. In part,
this would result from attempts by wealthier individuals to reduce the
cost of these services, since purchases in the public sector include the
additional cost of subsidizing low income recipients. 129 Perhaps more
importantly, it would reflect a desire to purchase quantities above
amounts provided by the public sector.' 30 To the extent that a tran-
sition of this type occurs, the net result of judicially-imposed stand-
ards of per capita equality could well be reduced levels of public sector
activity. Existing disparities in the distribution of services could there-
fore continue, or perhaps even be accentuated.
Thus, exclusive concern with the public sector, even under an osten-
sible standard of per capita equality, may ultimately result in the de-
facto imposition of a minimum standard. That is, when individuals
can obtain amounts above that provided publicly by resorting to
private sector purchases, per capita equality in the public sector be-
comes a politically determined minimum the courts have not sanc-
tioned and over which they have foresaken all influence. If the purpose
of judicial intervention is enforcement of a minimum standard, then
the courts should confront that task directly; they should disregard the
purchase of additional amounts whether those purchases occur in the
form of private or local public expenditures. Alternatively, if the courts
feel compelled to impose a standard of per capita equality, or if they
intend to eliminate private wealth as a factor in determining access to
127. See note 29 supra.
128. See p. 101 supra.
129. See pp. 108-11 supra.
130. In part, any change-over may be deterred by the fact that those resorting to
private sector distribution will also be required to contribute to the cost of publicly
distributed goods and services. This will not be a hindrance if individuals can supple-
ment amounts received by the public sector (for example, through use of both public
and private cultural and recreational facilities, private crime and fire prevention de-
vices, and the like). Barriers do exist, however, if resort to the private sector entails
foregoing publicly distributed goods and services, and thereby necessitates "°double pay-
ments" (e.g., in the case of education).
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municipal services, 3, then they must be willing to prohibit or regu-
late access to private markets. 132
B. The Financing of Local Public Goods and Services
Local political units typically obtain funds through percentage levies
on residential, commercial, and industrial property; on individual
earnings; and on the proceeds from retail sales. These financing
schemes share two characteristics which have a substantial impact on
the distribution of municipal services. First, the tax base from which
such revenues are derived may vary significantly from one community
to the next. Consequently, local political units will possess differing
fiscal capacities; that is, the same tax rate will generate different rev-
enues in different units.1 33 Second, under such tax schemes different
individuals within any given community will contribute different
amounts to local revenues depending on their income, wealth, and
consumption preferences, even though they receive the same level
of services. 134 These factors have a marked impact on horizontal and
131. Serrano condemned educational financing systems which render "the quality
of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." 5 Cal. 3d
at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (emphasis added). Prihate sector distribu-
tion yields the same result, and may well exacerbate inequalities. To treat these situations
dissimilarly is to impose a difference where there is no real distinction.
132. A comparison of Hadnot and Shaw is most instructive in this regard. The court
in Hadnot required equalization of recreational facilities funded out of general resenues.
However, the court refused to order equalization of street pavement, sidewalks, gutters.
fire hydrants, street lights, sewerage lines, street signs, and traffic lights, as well as
various other services. The court's refusal was based on the fact that these were funded
out of special assessment revenues. The court indicated that the differences were due to
the "respective landowners' ability and willingness to pay for the property inprose.
ments. This difference . . . does not constitute racially discriminator)' inequalit). The
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States was not designed to compel uniformity in the face of difference." 309 F. Supp.
at 970 (emphasis added). In contrast, the court in Shaw ordered the equalization of some
of the same goods and services (street paving, street lights, water lines, and sewerage
lines) where financed out of general revenues.
The court in Mclnnis clearly recognized this difficult)':
The more money the latter [wealthy] districts must supply to the fonner, the
less incentive the well-to-do will have to raise their tax rates. If the quality of good
public schools declines, affluent children have the option to attend pri%ate schools.
thus completely eliminating the need for the wealthy to raise taxes.
293 F. Supp. at 36.
133. The ensuing discussion is framed in terms of the revenues raised by local political
units. The same analysis, however, would be applicable to revenue contributions by
different benefit areas within a single unit. Also, as discussed in note 154 infra, similar
considerations arise in the context of differing input/output ratios within and betwei:n
political units.
134. While nearly universal in practice, percentage levies are not, of course, the
only possible means of local finance. An obvious alternative would be to employ asimple head tax, whereby each individual in the political unit would be aed a flat
fee for a given level of municipal services. The result would be similar to a user
charge system as employed in the private sector. See note 37 .supra. As discussed in note
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vertical equity, individual and community behavior, and the distri-
bution of income.
1. The Impact of Local Financing Schemes
a. Horizontal and Vertical Inequalities
Inequalities in fiscal capacity may be viewed as the local public sec-
tor analog to individual income inequalities in the private sector. Pros-
perous communities, like prosperous individuals, can purchase more
of a good or service with any given percentage expenditure of income
or wealth. Without more, this fact of differential purchasing power,
or vertical inequality, provides no independent basis for judicial in-
tervention.' 35
However, unlike income inequalities in the private sector, differences
in fiscal capacity may also lead to substantial horizontal inequalities. 13 u
With respect to private goods and services, individuals with equal
incomes possess equal purchasing power. In contrast, as a result of
differences in fiscal capacity, individuals with identical incomes and
identical preferences may spend equal sums for municipal services,
yet receive different amounts. Conversely, individuals with identical
incomes and preferences may receive equivalent amounts of such serv-
ices, yet make different dollar expenditures. Since these differentials
do not appear to reflect differences in purchasing power and/or con-
sumption preferences, they seem to lack an allocative rationale.
In the context of the locational processes described by Tiebout,
however, differences in fiscal capacity are simply one factor to be con-
sidered in making a locational choice. So long as there are no barriers
to mobility, an individual will stay in a unit with a lower fiscal capacity
only if he is obtaining other locational benefits offsetting the higher
148 infra, the results obtained under such a scheme would be quite different from those
described here.
Tiebout himself, unfortunately, never directly addressed the problem of financing
schemes. His 1956 discussion may be interpreted as involving a system of flat charges
rather than one of percentage levies; the 1961 discussion was framed it terms of
percentage levies. Tiebout, supra note 31.
135. As suggested at pp. 108-11 supra, judicial intervention in the face of vertical
inequalities may be justified where access to a particular good or service is considered
a fundamental right. As discussed at note 157 infra, however, there are some difficulties
in the direct equalization of fiscal capacities as a means of protecting such fundamental
rights.
136. An early discussion focusing on horizontal inequalities in the context of local
political units, and urging a system of interunit transfers on equitable grounds, may be
found in Buchanan, Federalism and Fiscal Equity, 40 Am. Ecox. RtV. 583 (1950).
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effective costs of municipal services. 137 As noted above, t38 the particu-
lar trade-off between private and local public services chosen by the
individual under these circumstances may not always be optimal from
the societal point of view, and consequently the process may not always
be efficient. But there is no reason to condemn the result simply be-
cause of apparent horizontal inequalities in the local public sector.
b. Individual and Community Incentives
The standard methods of financing municipal services have con-
siderable impact on the incentives facing individuals and communi-
ties. All other things equal,139 it will always be to the individual's
advantage to locate in the community with the greatest fiscal capacity,
since he thereby minimizes his unit costs for each municipal service.
As explained above, however, the individual's response to these incen-
tives may not always minimize society's costs, and may consequently
give rise to inefficiencies. 40
The same factors also yield certain collective incentives. It will al-
ways be to the advantage of a community to encourage residence by
relatively wealthy individuals and by commercial and industrial con-
cerns,' 4 ' since they will generally contribute most to the community's
fiscal capacity. Moreover, the goods and services offered by a local politi-
cal unit are often not purely public even within its own boundaries.
1 "
It will therefore be to the community's advantage to go even further
and completely exclude relatively poor residents through methods such
as exclusionary zoning,' 43 since such residents are likely to require
137. On the other hand, where there are substantial barriers to mobility such as ex-
tremely high relocation costs, there may be substantial horizontal inequalities in the
local public sector which are not compensated for by other locational advantages, such
as better employment opportunities.
It should be noted that exclusionary zoning, though clearly a substantial barrier to
mobility, is unlikely to result in such uncompensated horizontal inequalities, since its
tendency is to induce economic stratification of communities, and thts to insure that
individuals of the same income class live in communities with similar fiscal capacities.
138. See pp. 106-08 supra.
139. In practice, the individual simultaneously seeks to maximize his welfare with
respect to the costs and benefits of both private and public goods and services. Con.
sequently, an individual will accept higher effective costs per unit of municipal services
if he is obtaining offsetting benefits from location in a particular area.
140. See pp. 106-08 supra.
141. This assumes that the industrial and commercial concerns contribute more in
revenues than they impose in costs. These costs may involve need for additional local
public goods and services as well as spillovers such as noise and air pollution.
142. See notes 28-29 supra.
143. Exclusionary zoning may be viewed as a public sector analog to tie-ins in te
private sector. That is, the purchase of municipal services must be accompanied by the
purchase of a large lot and an expensive residence. But since communities are not com-
peting for residents per se, there are no public sector incentives to alter this s)stem. Con-
sequently, if it is to be altered at all, it must be altered by the courts.
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additional services which exceed in cost the increase in local reve-
nues. 14 On the one hand, such exclusionary activity by communities
may offset the tendencies described above'141 to over-populate certain
areas, and may thereby serve an efficiency generating function.1' 0 On
the other hand, highly restrictive zoning policies may lead to a misallo-
cation of resources. 4 7 They also act as a considerable restraint oil
mobility, and thus choice, for the less prosperous members of society,
and are likely to result in stratification of political units by economic
class.
1 48
c. The Distribution of Wealth
Individual and community responses to the incentives described
above may have a substantial impact on the distribution of wealth.
In terms of the financing and distribution of municipal services, an
increase in exclusionary practices and a consequent decrease in mobil-
ity 49 will generally enhance the welfare of the already prosperous at
the expense of the relatively poor, while a decline in exclusion and an
increase in mobility will have just the opposite result1a5 Moreover,
144. The costs imposed by in-migrants may include other factors besides the provision
of municipal services. In particular, they may include perceived losses associated with
curtailment of neighborhood homogeneity.
145. See pp. 106-08 supra.
146. Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Complex Systems: The Case of Municipal
Zoning, 17 KYKLOS 419 (1964), demonstrates that zoning is necessary to achieve Pareto
optimality where the value of one site depends upon the character of adjoining sites. This
does not, however, dispose of the distributional question, namely, whether the excluding
group should compensate those being excluded. Indeed, tinder an effective system of
compensation, exclusionary zoning would be unnecessary.
147. Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969), suggests that exclusionary
zoning may lead to inefficient utilization of suburban resources. Crecine, Davis & Jackson,
Urban Property Markets: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for Municipal
Zoning, 10 J. LAW & EcoN. 79 (1967), suggests that the supposed interdependence justify-
ing zoning practices may not be as prevalent as assumed.
148. If municipal services were financed with a head tax rather than with percentage
levies, see note 134 supra, there would be no fiscal incentive for exclusionary zoning,
Communities would presumably admit anyone who was prepared to pay the local fee.
Similarly, individuals would find their choice of community unaffected by the relative
personal wealth of its residents, though they would presumably still be sensitive to the
relative size of the industrial and commercial tax base, and to the fiscal externalities
resulting from such factors as differences in community size, discussed at pp. 106.08
supra.
149. That is, a decrease in the mobility of the poor. The impact of exclusionary zon-
ing on an individual's mobility will obviously decline as his wealth and income increase.
150. The effect in terms of municipal services is clear if it is assumed that local
political units generate all of their revenues from proportional or progressive taxes on
personal wealth and income, and that exclusionary zoning leads to stratification of
political units by economic class. While relaxation of these assumptions to bring them
into line with reality would bring a corresponding decrease in the distributional effects
described, it would be unlikely to reverse those effects. Thus, municipal services are
financed in part out of revenues from business taxes, and the sources of such taxes are
clearly not distributed among communities in direct proportion to the personal wealth
of their residents. See p. 120 infra. Further, the elimination of exclusionary zoning is
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these distributional effects may be reinforced by other factors which
are only indirectly related to the provision of municipal services. Ex-
clusionary practices may prevent low income persons from selecting
optimal locations for private employment and consumption opportuni-
ties.iai Conversely, communities which engage in exclusionary zoning-
which will inevitably be the wealthier communities-frequently obtain
aesthetic, social, and economic benefits'5 2 quite apart from the protec-
tion of fiscal capacity.ita Enhanced mobility for the poor would reverse




There are at least three responses to the effects of local financing
schemes. First, it is arguable that the status quo represents a satisfactory
state of affairs. This position assumes that vertical inequalities are an
accepted element in the market for municipal services and that any
horizontal inequalities are resolved through individual locational
choices. It also accepts barriers to mobility as simply one aspect of
local political autonomy, and presumably views the latter as an interest
which takes precedence over the individual's stake in residential mobil-
ity. Finally, it retains any efficiency effects, both positive and negative,
resulting from exclusionary zoning and individual responses to fiscal
incentives.
A second response would be to introduce some system of fiscal capac-
ity equalizing-that is, a system which would ensure that a given tax
unlikely to lead to a complete mixture of the rich and the poor in residential com-
munities; cohesion by economic class will undoubtedly continue to some extent. Still.
increased mobility for the poor could hardly work to their disadvantage.
151. For example, it may prevent such persons from following employment opportuni-
ties to the suburbs. In this respect, exclusionary zoning may simply be inefticient in
that it may prevent in-migration even by those individuals whose net locational gain
would exceed the community's loss in fiscal capacity, and who would therefore be
willing to compensate the community for any loss it would suffer.
152. Thus, large-lot zoning may result in a visual and social homogeneity which
residents find pleasing, or may lead to particularly low levels of noise and waste
pollution.
153. Indeed, in many cases such considerations, rather than fiscal incentives, may
be the primary motive for restrictive zoning practices.
154. Variations among political units, or among benefit areas within political units,
in terms of input/output ratios-that is, in terms of the ultimate value of an output.
such as educational advancement or effectiveness of police protection, per dollar of
input-will lead to much the same effects as have been described here for %ariations in
community wealth. Indeed, the former may be of greater practical significance, particular-
ly with respect to education and police protection. Thus, individuals will have an in-
centive to move into communities where, because of social, political, geographic, or other
factors, their taxes will be most efficient in securing municipal sersices. Likewise, com-
munities will have an incentive to erect barriers to in-migration by those persons whose
presence might undermine the effectiveness of the existing s)stems for delihery of such
services. Parallel problems of horizontal equity and distribution of wealth will also arise.
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rate generates the same amount of revenue per capita in every political
unit, while still allowing each unit to establish its own tax rate.10
This approach eliminates variations in community wealth as an incen-
tive for either individual mobility or exclusionary zoning. It would
not, however, interfere with exclusionary zoning policies motivated
by other considerations, although it would compensate-at least in
part-those whose mobility was curtailed by such devices.1 10 More-
over, because equalization of fiscal capacities requires the transfer of
funds between political units, it will result in some redistribution."1
Because existing tax bases are not always directly correlated with
the relative wealth of the community's residents, however, the direc-
tion of these transfers as between income classes is problematic.' 8
Finally, the relative efficiency of this approach is also uncertain. While
equalization may eliminate some inefficiencies by reducing community
wealth as an incentive to individual mobility, it would not resolve
congestion inefficiencies' 5 and might also introduce other ineffi-
155. This approach has received particular attention in the context of tile school
finance decisions. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
156. It would not, however, alleviate the impact of differential input/output rela.
tionships. See note 154 supra. Moreover, to the extent that individuals suffer relative
losses with respect to factors other than the varying costs of municipal services, see pp.
118-19 supra, equalization of fiscal capacities does not provide full compensation. Of
course, "compensation" in this context makes sense only if it is decided that the dis.
tribution of wealth which accompanies a system of full mobility is the preferred dis-
tribution.
157. Standing alone, this mode of redistribution bears little direct relationship to
the fundamental Interests issue discussed at pp. 108-11 supra. In the first place, despite
equalization of fiscal capacities, a local political unit could provide its residents with
nothing at all of a good or service which the courts had deemed fundamental. Con-
sequently, equalization of fiscal capacities makes sense only if the fundamental interests
concept is modified to require only that equal efforts (as measured by percentage ex-
penditures) should yield equal opportunity (as measured by dollar expenditures), tile
determination of effort levels being left entirely as a matter of individual choice. Tile
equalization of fiscal capacities does not even comply with this watered-down standard,
however, since it involves a transfer between communities, not between individuals.
Within a political context, it guarantees only that some compromise level of effort will
be reached; no individual is free to make his own autonomous determination.
To a great extent, this latter difficulty disappears in the context of the Tlebout
Hypothesis. That is, each local political unit sets up an effort level; through his loca-
tional choice, each individual makes an independent determination of the effort he wishes
to expend. Consequently, equalization of fiscal capacities bears a rational relationship
to fundamental interests guarantees only insofar as it is coupled with unfettered mobility.
And given inevitable restraints on mobility and limitations on the range of alternatives,
this approach only crudely approximates the fundamental interests norm. While such
imperfections may be of relatively minor significance in the context of efficiency con.
siderations, they may be of central importance in the context of fundamental interest
guarantees.
158. Thus, fiscal capacity equalizing may work to the disadvantage of the poor in
those cases where they live in communities that enjoy an unusually large commercial
and industrial tax base.
159. See pp. 106-08 supra. The efficiency-generating characteristics of equalizing fiscal
capacities were suggested by Buchanan & Wagner, An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal
Equalization, in THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTPUT 138 (J. Margolis cd. 1970). The position
was disputed by Feldstein, Comment, in id. at 159. The avowedly "agnostic" tone of
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ciencies by distorting prices for municipal services.100
The last alternative is simply to abolish exclusionary zoning.' This
approach obviously puts a high premium on individual mobility as
opposed to community autonomy.0 2 Insofar as such enhanced mobility
leads to a more even distribution of the population by income class with
respect to local tax bases, this policy will also result in an equalization
of fiscal capacities, though clearly the result will be slower and less com-
plete than if done directly. A substantial redistributive effect in favor
of the poor is also likely, in that low income individuals will be free
to exploit all possible gains from relocation.0 3 Finally, the result is
likely to eliminate any misallocation of resources resulting from ex-
cessively restrictive exclusionary zoning practices, while the policy
itself will have no unwanted price effects. On the other hand, ineffi-
ciencies resulting from individual locational decisions made in the con-
text of fiscal externalities0 4 would remain, and those preferring




In many respects, economic analysis of the distribution of municipal
services is beset with uncertainties. Nevertheless, it provides a useful
framework for examining judicial intervention. The crucial point is
Buchanan's more recent work, supra note 90, at 40, would seem to suggest that he.no
longer views equalization of fiscal capacities as the efficient solution. Neterthelss. een
under Buchanan's current formulation, equalization of fiscal capacities may generate
certain efficiencies.
160. It artificially reduces the price of municipal services for some while artificially
increasing it for others. The result may be a net under- or over.allocation of resources
for the production of such services. See Musgrave, Approaches to A Fiscal Theory of
Political Federalism, in PUBLIC FINANCEs: NEEDS, SOURCES, AD UTILIZATION (National
Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1961).
161. A policy of busing may be viewed as one variant of this approach. Insofar as
it leads to a random distribution ot school children by wealth and income, busing
serves a substantial equalizing function.
162. Indeed, it could be argued that this policy would be over-inclusihe, since it
would inevitably cause communities to give up some values associated with restrictive
zoning which are not directly related to the provision of municipal setiices. See p.
119 supra. On the other hand, a policy of fiscal capacity equalizing would be under-
inclusive, since it would leave some barriers to individual Iocational choice for which
no compensation would be paid. See note 156 supra.
163. These gains would include private sector locational benefits, such as better
employment, as well as such advantages as the ability to live in more aesthetic sur-
roundings. They would also include gains related to exploitation of differential input/out-
put ratios. See pp. 118-19 supra.
164. See pp. 106-08 supra.
165. The Pareto optimal solution would require creation of a system whereby such
individuals could purchase their autonomy by paying off those they wished to exclude.
See note 83 supra.
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that the distribution of municipal services is a process; it is not a static
situation where changes wrought by the courts have only direct and
obvious consequences. Despite imperfect knowledge, transactions costs,
and impediments to mobility, individual locational decisions have sub-
stantial efficiency generating properties which would be eliminated by
a state-wide standard of per capita equality. The same is true, though
with some qualifications, with respect to a mandated standard of intra-
unit per capita equality. Furthermore, individual locational responses
to the latter measure would undoubtedly exacerbate the massive dif-
ficulties faced by central cities and their low income and minority
residents. For the same reasons, the courts must also display greater
care in distinguishing between wealth-related and race-related allo-
cational disparities.
The locational process has a counterpart in the form of exclusionary
zoning. Here, the courts are faced with a conflict between collective
interests in local political autonomy and individual interests in un-
fettered residential mobility. The most direct judicial alternatives are
to sanction or to prohibit exclusionary zoning. Whichever approach
the courts take, there will be an effect on the distribution of income.
In this context, the equalization of fiscal capacities is a halfway meas-
ure possessing uncertain consequences. It may provide partial com-
pensation to some of those who have been injured by exclusionary
zoning practices and other barriers to mobility, but such compensation
will be imperfect and incomplete.
Finally, certain of the goods and services distributed by local gov-
ernment may be of such fundamental importance that all individuals
have a right to them which should be protected by the courts. In such
cases, however, protection should take the form of mandated distri-
bution patterns independent of particular distributional processes.
Thus, the courts may require some guaranteed adequate minimum;
if so, deviations in availability above that minimum should be ig-
nored. Alternatively, the courts could impose a standard of per capita
equality; if so, then deviations from that standard, whether through
the public or the private sector, should be prohibited. Once again,
equalization of fiscal capacities is a halfway measure of dubious ration-
ale and uncertain effect.
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